This paper sheds light on how labor market regulations affect the relationship between different types of innovation and employment in Latin America. We estimate the effect of process and product innovation on employment growth using Enterprise Surveys for 14 Latin American countries. We calculate the model for the whole sample and then classify countries according to the rigidness of their labor market regulations. We find that: (i) product innovations have a positive impact on employment growth; (ii) process innovations do not affect employment growth; and (iii) more rigid labor market regulations (minimum wages and severance payments) reduce the effects of innovation.
Introduction
The fear that the development of new technology will generate an unprecedented job destruction is more widespread than ever. Consequently, the relationship between innovation and employment is nowadays at the core of the policy debate. Theoretically, this relationship is not straightforward and different schools of thought have conceptualized alternative channels that can counterbalance the initial effect of innovation on employment and leave the final effect undetermined (see Calvino and Virgillito 2018) . Innovation can create or destroy jobs depending, for example, on the institutional setting, market structure, and the type of innovation (i.e. product or process innovation).
The introduction of a new product, if successful, can increase the demand and, consequently, increase employment. However, if after the innovation the innovator earns market power, it could be optimal to set higher prices and reduce the production, reducing the demand of labor. A new product can also destroy jobs if it is designed to reduce costs, or will not affect employment if it just replaces old products without changes in demand. Similarly, the development or adoption of a new production process usually leads to greater efficiency in production, saving labor and/or capital, and therefore it usually causes job destruction. However, the efficiency gain could be translated to lower prices and, if the demand grows, process innovation could lead to higher employment (Coad and Rao 2011; Coad, Segarra, and Teruel 2016) .
Most empirical studies identify a positive link between product innovation and employment, especially when the products are not only new to the firm but also new to the entire market. The effect of process innovation is more ambiguous (see, amongst others, Benavente and Lauterbach 2008; Coad, Segarra, and Teruel 2016; Crespi, Tacsir, and Pereira 2019; De Elejalde, Giuliodori, and Stucchi 2015; Hall, Lotti, and Mairesse 2009) .
The empirical literature that uses firm-level data followed different approaches to examine the link between innovation and employment. Several authors used reduced-form equations to assess the effect of innovation effort, innovation, or different types of innovation on employment (Bogliacino, Piva, and Vivarelli 2012; for employee-driven innovation and organizational innovation. Zhou, Dekker, and Kleinknecht (2011) confirm that firms with high proportions of fixed-term contracts perform worse on the sales of innovative new products but also find that they tend to have higher sales of 'imitative' new products. In sum, the literature finds that an increase in minimum wages can speed up the adoption of labor-saving technologies to decrease employment and the higher costs associated with it, and the literature on contractual flexibility finds mixed results. Hence, ex ante, we might expect that countries with higher minimum wages, which make employment costlier, are countries in which innovation could be exploited by firms to save in labor costs. Therefore, we might anticipate smaller or negative labor-saving innovation effects on employment growth in countries with higher minimum wages. However, process innovation does not capture labor-saving innovations only, impeding an ex-ante prediction of the overall effects of process innovation when minimum wages are high. Moreover, the link between contractual flexibility and innovation is not clear a priori, making empirical testing necessary to understand which mechanism prevails.
We estimate HJMP's model using data from Enterprise Surveys (ES) for 14 Latin-American countries and we use the difference in terms of minimum wages and severance payments to address the effect of labor market regulations. This dataset has two important characteristics for our study. First, it provides us with data that is comparable across countries and therefore allows us to use the cross-country difference in labor market regulations to identify their effect on the link between innovation and employment. Second, the dataset collected in 2010 in Latin America contains information on the proportion of sales that comes from new products, a key variable needed to estimate the HJMP model. As previous studies, our findings confirm the positive relationship between innovation and employment. However, we find that these results heavily depend on the labor market regulations; when labor market regulations are rigid, innovation does not create employment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical strategy. In Section 3 we describe the data. Section 4 shows the results. Section 5 entails robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Empirical Strategy
To study the effect of innovation on employment we estimate the model proposed by Harrison et al. (2014) . The authors show that without imposing some structure it is difficult to understand the effect of innovation on employment. Because of this reason, they propose a simple two-periods two-products model in which, under standard assumptions about the production function and cost-minimizing firms, it is possible to estimate the effect of product and process innovation on employment. After solving the model, Harrison et al. (2014) show that the growth of employment can be explained by five elements: the average efficiency growth in the production of old products (α 0 ), the introduction of process innovations related to old products (d), change in output growth of old products (y 1 ), increase in output growth of new products (y 2 ), and the impact of unanticipated productivity shocks (u):
Thus, the parameter α 1 in eq. (1) picks up the effect of process innovation and β represents the relative efficiency of the production of old and new products. If β < 1, new products are produced more efficiently than old ones, and employment grows at a smaller rate than the output of new products (y 2 ). Like Harrison et al. (2014) , we do not observe the physical growth of outputs (y 1 , y 2 ) but a proxy, the real growth of outputs that is obtained by deflating the nominal growth of sales of old and new products (g 1 and g 2 , respectively). Replacing and rearranging terms we obtain the estimating equation:
The error term v includes u and the difference between the firm-level price, and the deflator used deflated nominal variables. If product and process innovation (g 2 and d) are not correlated with the error term u, the OLS estimate of the parameters α 0 , α 1 and β in eq. (2) is consistent. As Harrison et al. (2014) pointed out, a possible concern that could create this correlation and the corresponding endogeneity problem is the presence of omitted variables correlated with both employment and innovation variables, for instance the level of productivity. However, given that eq. (2) is a growth equation, all time-invariant firm-specific characteristics are canceled out. Therefore, if the productivity of firm i is given by a time-invariant firm-specific characteristic -for example related to the entrepreneur´s managerial ability -plus a random component, eq. (2) can be estimated by OLS. However, if the productivity shocks are not random -for instance if innovation and productivity are correlated with the business cycle -then the OLS estimation is not consistent. To address this possible correlation, we include a set of industry dummies in eq. (2). Industry dummies in a growth equation are analogue to the inclusion of the interaction of industry dummies with a year dummy in a level equation. Thus, these industry dummies capture the effect of an industry-specific business cycle.
The key assumption for innovation being uncorrelated with productivity is that innovations are the result of the success of "technological investments", mainly R&D, which have to be decided upon by firms in advance and depend on their individual productivity effects. However, if firms were, in fact, carrying out these investments within the period affected by the shocks, lagged values of the included variables would be uncorrelated with u. Our data do not allow us to run this robustness check. Nevertheless, if innovation is positively related to productivity shocks, it will be negatively correlated with the random error u. Therefore, in that case we should expect a downward bias in the coefficients on d and y 2 , obtaining larger employment displacement effects for process innovation and smaller effects for product innovation. We will show that, after controlling for the measurement problems, our estimates seem free of such biases.
Another source of concern, already pointed out by Harrison et al. (2014) , is that we observe nominal sales (g 1 and g 2 ) rather than real production (y 1 and y 2 ). With firm-level information about prices, this would not be an issue. However, given that we do not have firm-level data on prices and we deflate nominal variables using the consumer price index, there is a measurement error problem that could create an endogeneity issue.
If there is a difference between the deflator we employ and firm-level prices, two problems arise. The measurement error in y 1 implies that we can only identify part of the effect of process innovation, causing an attenuation bias in the estimation of both α 1 and β. However, our imperfect measure of y 2 might also create an endogeneity problem when the sales growth rate from new products is correlated with the error term (ν).
To overcome this bias, we follow an instrumental variable strategy. In particular, we look for an instrument correlated with real growth in the production of new products (y 2 ), but uncorrelated with all that may be in the error after substituting g 2 for y 2 (for instance, u and the difference in firm-level prices and the deflator we used).
We use a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm received public support for innovation as our instrument. We can show that this instrument satisfies the relevance condition, i.e. it is significantly correlated with the instrumented variable y 2 , by observing the F-statistic in Table 2 . Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) recommend an F-statistic greater than 10 to avoid a problem of weak instruments and our estimated F-statistics are larger in all the specifications. It also satisfies the robust weak instruments pre-test threshold of Olea and Pflueger (2013) .
The identification strategy also requires the instrument to be exogenous once we control for industry, location, and time-invariant productivity. Although this assumption cannot be tested, it would be invalidated only if firms that obtained public support for innovation are different from the rest and if that difference is correlated with the outcome of interest. This could be the case if, for example, more productive firms decide to participate in this type of program and we do not control for this selection bias. However, by estimating a growth equation, we are controlling for any fixed characteristic of the firms, such as invariant productivity, size, and location, and it seems unlikely that firms would apply to support for innovation because of temporary productivity shocks.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data on firms stem from ES, 1 which is a representative firm-level survey of an economy's private sector. The ES covers a large set of countries and a broad range of business environment topics. The surveys are stratified with random sampling, 2 where the strata are firm size, business sector, and geographic region within a country. 3 We focus on 14 Latin-American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) 4 because for these countries in 2010 the ES included, in addition to the standard set of questions, a detailed questionnaire on innovation activities; including a question on the percentage of sales that results from the introduction of new products, which is key to estimate g 2 in HJMP's model. Given that firms were asked about their sales and permanent full-time employment both for the last fiscal year and three years before, we constructed a panel of firms for 2007-2009 and calculated employment and sales growth between those years.
We only consider firms in the manufacturing sector with complete data on total sales, total cost of intermediate inputs (energy costs, cost of raw materials, and overhead and other expenses), labor inputs, and support for innovation. To clean the data from outliers, we first winsorized firm-level variables with cutoffs at the 1 % tails 5 and then dropped observations with labor cost or material cost higher than sales. To make sure that the final sample does not differ substantially from the original sample, we exclude industries with fewer than five observations or where the number of usable observations is less than half the number of original observations. Finally, we exclude all surveys with fewer than 40 observations and with less than 40 % of the original observations. From the initial 9,216 observations, only 3,166 are left after cleansing. Although the number of firms shrunk considerably, there is a clear gain in the quality of the data remaining.
The indicators of innovation are based on a framework provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Oslo Manual, where product innovation is defined as the "introduction of a new or significantly improved product", and process innovation as "(a) methods of manufacturing goods or offering services; (b) logistics, delivery, or distribution methods for inputs, products, or services; and (c) supporting activities such as maintenance systems or operations for purchasing accounting or computing". We have information on whether the establishment introduced a product or process innovation in the last three years. 6 This lets us categorize firms into four groups: No innovation, Only product innovation, Only process innovation, and Product and process innovation. Furthermore, the survey contains detailed information about the composition of sales, namely sales of 2010 and the percentage of sales corresponding to new products in 2010. With the first two variables, we can construct the nominal growth rate in sales (g) which can be decomposed into the nominal growth in sales of old products (g 1 ) and the nominal growth in sales of new products (g 2 ). The ES also provides us with our instrumental variable, i.e. support for innovation, as it includes the question: "In the last 3 years: did this establishment use any services to support innovation?".
To study the presence of heterogeneous effects for firms with different labor market regulations, we use the following labor market indicators: Redundancy Cost ("Weeks of severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment"), and Minimum Wage Effectiveness. The source of the first indicator is the 2008 Doing Business data on labor market regulations (which refers to 2007). The second is constructed using the ILO Global Wage Database and households' surveys. We retrieve the minimum wage from the ILO Global Wage Database and mean wages from national household surveys. The minimum wage refers to the national monthly, nominal, minimum wage in place as of December 31 st of each year. In cases where a national minimum wage is not mandated, ILO uses the minimum wage in place in the capital, the major city or an average of multiple major cities. In countries where the minimum wage is set at the sectoral level, ILO applies the minimum wage for unskilled workers. Minimum wages are not reported for countries for which collective bargaining is in place for minimum wages.
Following Lee (1999) , we define the effectiveness of the minimum wage as the distance between the minimum wage in a country and some measure of centrality of wages within the country. Lee (1999) uses the median wage as an indicator of location and uses the ratio of the minimum wage over the median wage as the "effective" minimum wage. We use the mean wage instead of the median, because we could not find the median wage for Guatemala in the period under analysis, but in robustness checks we show that variations in the measure of centrality do not affect the results.
We divide countries according to the two labor market indicators into two categories each: high or low redundancy cost and high or low effectiveness of the minimum wage (Figure 1) . We consider that a country has high (low) redundancy cost when the period of severance pay is above (below) the region median. 7 We consider that a country has high (low) effectiveness of the minimum wage when the minimum wage/mean wages ratio is above (below) the median. The vertical dashed line represents the median of the minimum wage effectiveness (0.59) and the horizontal dashed line, the median of severance payments (65 weeks of salary due when terminating a redundant worker). If we analyze each indicator separately, Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, Honduras, Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador exhibit more rigid labor markets in terms of minimum wage effectiveness than Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay and Mexico. While Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Argentina, Paraguay, El Salvador and Honduras present more rigid labor markets in terms of severance payments than Colombia, Peru, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Nicaragua. Nevertheless, if we study the indicators jointly, Paraguay, Argentina, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras have the most rigid labor market regulations. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the distribution of firms and employment growth. Column 1 includes all firms; in columns 2-5 firms are divided into different categories according to their labor market characteristics. Most firms in the sample (72 %) introduced some sort of innovation, and of these firms more than half (54 %) are both process and product innovators. 8 Innovators tend to have higher employment growth than noninnovators, except for process-only innovators, which have the lowest average yearly employment growth. 9 This is in line with the standard view that process innovation destroys employment. The higher rates of employment growth showed by product innovators (both "product-only" and "product and process") are also reflected in higher rates of real sales growth and of labor productivity growth.
In columns 2 and 3 we compare firms in countries where the minimum wage effectiveness is above/below median. It is important to note that in countries with high minimum wage effectiveness firms have almost half of the permanent employees of firms in countries with low minimum wage effectiveness (17.2 vs. 33.8). It is also interesting to note that firms in countries with higher minimum wage effectiveness show slightly higher employment growth. Countries with severance payments below and above the median (columns 4-5) do not exhibit significant differences in employment or employment growth. It is also worth mentioning that the percentage of firms with product or process innovation is significantly higher when minimum wages are higher. This might reflect what the literature on minimum wages finds: when employment becomes more expensive due to labor market rigidities, firms are more willing to adopt labor-saving technologies. Table 2 presents the results of estimating eq. (2) by OLS (Panel A) and IV (Panel B). In all regressions, we control for age, age squared, initial size, foreign ownership, industry and country dummies. Column 1 shows results in the full sample, namely for all 3,166 firms; columns 2-5 depict the estimated coefficients in subsamples characterized by different labor market regulations. According to OLS estimates, product innovation (g 2 ) has a positive and significant effect on employment growth in the full sample, and process innovations (d) is not significant. Once we instrument for product innovation (g 2 ), we find that product innovation has an even stronger effect on employment growth, while process innovation remains insignificant. These results are in line with the empirical literature that applied the same methodology in Latin-American countries (Crespi, Tacsir, and Pereira 2019) . 10 In addition, this shows that the IV approach is working and helps us to mitigate the downward bias of the OLS estimates.
Empirical Results
In columns 2 and 3 we analyze how minimum wage influences the effect of innovations on employment growth. In countries where the effectiveness of the minimum wage is below the median (i.e. the minimum wage is further from mean wages), the effect of product innovation is reinforced. On the contrary, when labor markets are more rigid in terms of minimum wages being closer to mean wages, the effect of innovation is cancelled out. This result holds once we instrument for product innovation. It is also important to note that the instrument corrects the downward bias of the OLS estimation.
Similarly, columns 4 and 5 show the effect of severance payment regulations. In this case, the need to instrument is even more important. In fact, the OLS estimation shows that the effect of innovation on employment growth could be positive in rigid -in terms of severance payments -labor markets. However, the IV estimate that corrects for measurement errors shows that this holds only in more flexible labor markets where innovation creates permanent employment. The IV results are more intuitive because in rigid labor markets employers internalize the higher dismissal cost and decide to hire fewer employees.
We now turn to the effects of process innovation, which can also include labor-saving technologies. According to both, the OLS specification and the IV, there is no significant effect of process innovation on employment growth.
Finally, the magnitude of the coefficient β expresses the relative efficiency of the production of new versus old products. In IV estimates, whenever β is found to be significantly different from zero, it is always close to 1. In Table 2 , we present tests of the null hypothesis H0: β = 1, which is never rejected. That is, there is no evidence that new products are produced with higher efficiency than old products, i.e. we do not find productivity gains and employment-displacements associated with product innovation.
Robustness Checks
In this section we run some robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of the results to alternative modeling assumptions. First, our empirical strategy above controls for unobserved factors that vary by sectors and countries. Given that there are factors which might change by industry within each country -for example, prices and productivity -our first robustness check controls for those factors by including country-sector fixed effects. Table 3 shows that the results are similar to the basic model. Second, using Figure 1 we divide countries into three categories of rigidity of labor market regulations depending on their minimum wage effectiveness and their severance payment classification: (1) High-High; (2) High-Low or Low-High; and (3) Low-Low. (A) and (B) in Table 4 present the OLS and IV estimates for each group. More rigid labor market regulations in terms of both (column 1) or either (column 2) minimum wage effectiveness and severance payments reduce the effects of innovation on employment. In fact, product innovation is significant only in the countries with low minimum wage effectiveness and low severance payment. Third, we include additional instruments to test for exogeneity of the instruments using a Sargan-Hansen overidentification test. The additional instrument is an indicator that takes value one if the firm invests in R&D in the last fiscal year (R&D dummy). The exogeneity of the R&D assumption is sensible because the investment in R&D is correlated with time-invariant firm attributes -something we control for -rather than productivity shocks. Table 5 in the Appendix shows the estimates for this overidentified model. The results resemble the basic model and the Sargan-Hansen test does not reject exogeneity of the instruments. Finally, following Lee (1999) we define the effectiveness of the minimum wage using the median wage instead of the average wage. This variable is less affected by outliers. We remove the Guatemala survey from our sample because we did not have information on its median wage. The countries that change classification are El Salvador, Honduras, Chile, and Ecuador. El Salvador and Honduras are now classified as low effectiveness minimum wage countries, while Chile and Ecuador as high. Table 6 in the Appendix shows that our results are robust to using the median wage as the measure of centrality.
Conclusions
The link between innovation and employment is not straightforward and different schools of thought have conceptualized alternative channels that can counterbalance the initial effect of innovation on employment and leave the final effect undetermined (see Calvino and Virgillito 2018) . Innovation can create or destroy jobs depending, for example, on the institutional setting, market structure, and the type of innovation (i.e. product or process innovation), and the literature has documented several compensation mechanisms that can alter the initial effect of innovation on employment. Moreover, there is a vast literature regarding how labor market regulations may increase labor costs and affect job creation per se, making it reasonable to believe that more rigid labor market regulations can change the compensation mechanisms triggered by innovation. Yet, only few studies have analyzed the role of labor market regulations in the relationship between innovation and employment, and none of them have studied this dynamic in Latin-American countries.
The main contribution of our paper is to provide empirical evidence on the role of different labor market regulations on the link between innovation and employment for Latin America and, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to use HJMP model in this context. The main advantage of this strategy is that by imposing structure it allows us to obtain estimated coefficients with meaningful interpretation; something that is more difficult in a simple reduced-form approach. We estimate the HJMP model employing data from the ES for 14 Latin-American countries and we use the difference in terms of minimum wages and severance payments to address the effect of labor market regulation.
As previous studies, our results show that product innovation has a positive effect on permanent employment growth. However, we find that those gains are lost in settings characterized by high minimum wages or high severance payments that make the labor market more rigid, i.e. labor market regulations seem to offset the benefits of product innovation on employment growth. We find no evidence of efficiency gains in the production of new products compared to old products. In terms of process innovation, our results show that process innovation does not affect employment.
These results provide evidence that when assessing the pros and cons of labor market regulations, like minimum wage and severance pay for redundancy dismissal, it is necessary to consider the benefits not only on current employees but also on potential employees that observe lower job creation.
Our data do not allow us to explore the effects of innovation on other types of employment that are relevant in some Latin-American countries, like temporary or informal employment. Even so, it is reasonable to expect that high labor costs could prevent the creation of jobs that could reduce informality. We also acknowledge that labor market regulations can affect innovation adoption itself or labor-saving technologies and new products; although this analysis lies outside the scope of our work, it is reasonable to argue that the final effect of labor regulations on employment would be even larger after considering that innovation could be lower in countries were labor regulations are more rigid. Finally, it is important to note that the type of innovations that we are considering in this paper are incremental innovations or innovations which, in some cases, are not new to the market. Further research that explore the effect of radical innovations would provide a natural extension to our work. 
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